
Microsoft 365
Entra ID Directory Enumeration: The Attack Map
A default member in Entra ID can enumerate the whole directory: every user, group, service principal and role assignment. The controls that narrow it.
By Paul Bentley38 min read
On this page
- Read access is not low-risk, it is just quiet
- There are two doors, not one
- 1. Make stolen credentials useless on their own
- 2. Close the consent phishing path
- 3. Tighten the default user role, but not the way you think
- 4. Reduce what is worth stealing
- 5. Protect the privileged tier, with realistic expectations
- 6. Assume it will happen anyway, and instrument for it
- Turning the logs on
- Neither the wait nor the silence is documented
- What it costs, and why you baseline first
- The query I nearly published
- Metrics that measure the wrong thing
- Why there is no corrected query here
- The export that is one request
- What this adds up to
In August 2026 a criminal seller advertised around 3.6 million employee records taken from corporate Entra ID tenants, across nine large organisations. The datasets are reported to hold names, corporate email addresses, phone numbers, employee IDs, job titles and department information, which is to say the ordinary contents of a directory.
What makes it worth your attention is what it was not. No Azure vulnerability and no zero day have been found. Researchers attribute the access to stolen credentials and infostealer infections, which means ordinary valid logins reading exactly what those logins were always permitted to read. The claims come from a criminal seller, and the scale may not survive scrutiny. The mechanism will, because it needs nothing your tenant does not already allow.
Earlier this year I published a post about the Graph API endpoints that matter to architects. It walks through tenant discovery, identity and access auditing, privileged role review and licensing analysis. It is, read uncharitably, a reconnaissance guide. The same calls I use to produce a tenant assessment for a client produce a complete map of that client's directory for anyone else who can make them.
That is the point I want to make here, not a problem with the post. The difference between an architect running an assessment and an attacker running reconnaissance is who is holding the credential, and whether anyone is looking, not the API, the permissions, or the tooling.